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KANT ON "THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING" OR THE EVENTUAL 
REALIZATION OF ALL POSSIBILITIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
by 
JAAKKO HINTIKKA 
One of the most fascinating themes in the history of western thought-in any 
case one of the themes that have actually exerted strongest fascination on historians 
ideas-is the assumption wh:ich in its crude form says that in the long run every­
thing possible happens. In a slightly more guarded formulation, it says that no pos· 
sibility can remain unfulfilled through an infinity of time. In this sense, every (per­
manent) possibility is sometimes realized. Conversely, what is never realized is im· 
possible, and by the same token what holds always (omnitemporally) holds by 
necessity. 
The long-range history of this assumption was studied by A.O. Lovejoy in his 
famous book The Great Chain of Being. He misleadingly dubbed the assumption 
the Principle of Plenitude. This is misleading because the principle only asserts an 
equation betwieen possibilities and their realizations in time. It can therefore be as 
much or as little a Principle of Paucity of Possibilities as a Principle of the Plenitude 
of their Realizations. 
Nor is this criticism of Lovejoy only a matter of systematic ,or "architectonic" 
interest. It is directly relevant to the underlying reasons for the historical interest of 
the Principle of Plenitude (as we shall go on calling it in the absence of any other 
handy label). Because the Principle asserts the balance between possibilities and 
their temporal actualizations, it is sensitive not only to shifts in people's ideas of 
what there actually is in the world '(i.e., in their ideas of the relative richness or 
poverty of our universe), but also to changes in thinkers' conceptions of what more 
or less hidden possibilities there perhaps lurk waiting to be realized. Since these con­
ceptions are often highly important but difficult to approach directly, the Principle 
of Plenitude becomes a useful indicator of such partly or completely tacit assump­
tions concerning the range of ontological and physical options there are. The wider 
the purview of these possibilities grows, the harder it becomes for philosophers (and 
other speculative thinkers) to maintain the Principle. Conversely, every restriction 
in the scope of the contingencies one has to consider makes it easier ceteris paribus 
to uphold it. 
For instance, the gradual disenchantment of late medieval thinkers with the 
Principle of Plenitude is one of the best symptoms of that important broadening of 
the store of possibilities which in the late Middle Ages served "to push the examin· 
ation of questions beyond the confines of the physical possibilities licit within 
Aristotelian natural philosophy into the broader field of what was logically permiss­
ible", to speak with John Murdoch who emphasizes the role of this development 
not only in medieval theology and philosophy but also in late medieval science. If 
there is any reason to qualify Murdoch's statement, it is the absence of any real dis· 
tinction betwe�n "physical" and "logical" possibilities in Aristotelian thought. But 
this observation only enhances the novelty of late medieval innovators' venture to 
the field of what is only logically permissible. 
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It is characteristic of Lovejoy's approach that in dealing with the Renaissance 
period his main attention is attuned to the widening of the sphere of people's ideas 
about the actual universe. But this pertains only to one half of the equation that 
the Principle of Plenitude is, to realizations and not to possibilities. It is in this res· 
pect a sobering thought that in spite of the tremendous expansion of the intellect­
ual boundaries of the actual world only exceedingly wild thinkers in the stamp of 
Bruno could find these boundaries wide enough to uphold the Principle. For all 
others, possibilities had multiplied even faster than their presumed realizations. 
In Kant, we are confronted with an essentially different historical situation. 
What is even more important, the general direction on development is different in 
his case from what we find with the medievals. One way of looking at the overall 
impact of his philosophy is to say that by emphasizing the concept of possible ex­
perience and the limitation of tei;timate human conceptual thought to this possible 
experience, Kant in effect carved out of the wealth of all absolute possibilities a 
much narrower range of options, the humanly or empirically possible ones. This 
way of looking at the upshot of Kant's philosophy is lent contemporary interest 
by Hintikka's recent arguments, modified and developed further from Quine's well· 
known attacks on quantiHed modal logic, that an unrestricted use of logical (an­
alytical or conceptual) modalities is pragmatically impossible. if we want to use 
them in conjunction with such staple concepts as individual, identity, and quanti­
fication. For if these arguments are well taken, it follows that the only way of sav­
ing logical modalities is to restrict somehow the realm of "possible worlds" we are 
considering. And this is just what Kant is doing on the view here suggested. Hence it 
would appear that Kant's thinking offers us an interesting example of a pioneering 
foray into a direction which we are all just now being inexorably pushed by the de­
velopment of the semantics and pragmatics of modal logic. 
The purpose of this paper is to supply some indirect evidence for this way of 
looking at Kant's achievement. Again, the ill-named ''Principle of Plenitude" per­
forms its symptomatic function extremely well, we shall argue. Already the overall 
development of Kant's relationship to the Principle matches the expectations which 
our general view of its role as an ontological balance sheet naturally give rise. 
Kant's early views are well in line with Lovejoy's main emphasis. Lovejoy con­
siders the Principle of Plenitude well-nigh exclusively from the vantage point of the 
richness of the realizations of possibilities, not from the direction of the paucity of 
the set of these possibilities themselves. Furthermore, he has largely in mind only 
one possible source of this richness, viz. the plenitude of the creation of the Wli­
verse. In general, the idea of creation is important for Lovejoy's outlook on the 
Principle of Plenitude. A corollary to this outlook is Lovejoy's inability to cope 
with the attitude of those thinkers for whom the notion of creation played a subor­
dinate or negligible role. Thus he gets Plato's and Aristotle's views neatly upside 
down. He claims that Plato accepted the Principle but that Aristotle did not, where­
as the truth is much closer to the opposite. 
Furthermore, it may be expected on the basis of an accurate appraisal of the 
Principle as a mere equation that its applicability to a sufficiently omnipotent 
creator easily becomes problematic in that neither its attribution to nor its denial 
from God makes much sense. The reason for this is that the Principle presupposes 
an independently specifiable range of possibilities whose realizations are at stake. 
Leibniz' possible worlds are perhaps the clearest cases in point. However, as soon as 
a thinker conceives of the realm of possibilities as being themselves created by a 
Divine decree, it almost becomes a matter of intellectual and theological taste 
whether we say that all po.ssibilities are thereby ipso facto "realized", or whether 
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we want to put the shoe on the other foot and to say that since God could have es­
tablished a different set of possibilities, He has left something undone that He has 
the power to do. Yet this choice makes all the difference to the Principle of Pleni· 
tude as applied to God. This confusion can be found repeatedly in the actual histor· 
ical material. 
Be this as iit may, the pre-critical Kant does Lovejoy proud in his emphasis on the 
connection between plenitude and creation. While still in his dogmatic slumbers 
Kant professed to something very much like the Principle of Plenitude. In his Allge­
meine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755) he adheres to this doc­
trine, and motivates it by reference to the idea of infinite creation. God's creation 
of the world is without limits. The primary matter he has (directly) created is so 
"rich" that in the course of eternity it shall realize all possibilities. 
And hence it may be laid down, with good reason, that the arrangement 
and institution of the universe comes about gradually, as it arises out of 
the provision of the created matter of nature in the sequence of time. But 
the primitive matter itself, whose qualities and forces lie at the basis of all 
changes, is an immediate consequence of the Divine existence; and that 
same matter must therefore be at once so rich and so compiete, that the 
development of its combinations in the flow of eternity may extend over 
a plane which includes in itself all that can be, which accepts no limit, and, 
in short, which is infinite. (Universal Natural History and Theory of the 
Heavens, tr. by W. Hastie, The University of Michigan Press, 1969, Ann 
Arbor, Mich., p. 140, our italics.) 
The same year 17 55 Kant published his "Habilitationsschrift" Principiorum 
primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio. The upshot of his discussion 
of possibilities and their realizations· there is the same as in A llgemeine Naturge -
schichte, but the explicit motivation is somewhat more complicated. The central 
thesis of this dissertation is the so-called principle of sufficient reason or, as Kant 
pref erred to call it, of determining reason. According to this principle everything 
has its determining reason; no contingent being can come to be without its existence 
having an antecedent determining reason. Since there cannot be an infinite regress 
of these determining reasons, there has to exist a being whose existence precedes its 
possibility. This is the necessary being, God. 
We are thus witnessing in these pre-critical writings of Kant's a full-dress rehersal 
of several of the grand metaphysical themes Lovejoy so lovi.ngly described. Indeed, 
what Kant is worried about is but the venerable problem of theodicy. God has just 
been found to be the first determining reason for everything else, a necessary pre­
condition for the possibility of all other beings. Since nothing therefore can come 
to being without its determining reason, so that in a sense only what happens can 
happen, and what doesn't happen cannot happen. God seems to bear the moral re­
sponsibility for everything that happens in the world. (For God cannot be imagined 
without the other main precondition of responsibility, knowledge of the effects of 
His work of creation.) How is it then to be understood that God has decided to cre­
ate the world like this, when he must have been aware ahead of time that his act of 
creation already included all the undeniable future evils and defects in the outcome 
of His creative activity? How is this consistent with God's goodness which ought to 
make Him shy away from all evil? And Kant answers: 
Die Unendliche Gute Gottes strebt nach der moglichst grossen Vollkomm 
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enheit der geschaff enen Dinge und nach dem Gluck der Geisterwelt. In die­
sem unendlichen Streben, sich zu offenbaren, hat sie ihre Miihe nicht bloss 
auf die vollkommeneren Reihen ihrer Ergebnisse, welche sich dann der 
Reihe der Griinde gemass weiter entwickeln sollten, verwendt, sondem 
damit nichts auch von den Giitern niederen Grades fehle, damit die ganze 
Welt in ihrer Unermesslichkeit alles, von der hochsten dem Endlichen mog­
lichen Stufe der Vollkommenheit bis zu alien niederen und bis auf sozusa­
gen das Nichts umfasse (our italics) hat er auch gestattet, dass Dinge in 
��inen Abriss sich einschlichen, die trotz der Beimischung uberwiegender 
Ubel wenigstens etwas Gutes, das Gottes Weisheit daraus hervorlockte, zur 
Off en fa rung des gottlichen Ruhmes durch ihre unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit 
beitrugen. (Immanuel Kant, Zur Logik und Metaphysik, Erste Abteilung: 
Die Schriften von 1755-65. Ed. by Karl Vorlander, second ed., Leipzig, 
1921, pp. 32-33.) 
In other words, the Principle of Plenitude is what Kant resorts to in order to "justi­
fy God's ways to men". 
These pre-critical ideas of Kant's are scarcely original. However, we shall not ex­
amine here their background in eighteenth-century German thought except for 
pointing out that they are not Leibnitian in that Leibniz emphatically rejected the 
Principle of Plenitude. However, the Principle was prevalent both in the Wolffian 
tradition and outside it {it is for instance found in Herder) so that Kant had plenty 
of immediate precursors in these respects. His theodicy is likewise a variant of well­
known themes whose genealogy is partly delineated by Lovejoy. 
Anyway, the answer to the theodicy problem just indicated did not satisfy Kant 
for long. In his essay "Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des 
Daseins Gottes" (1763) Kant still holds that there has to be a necessary being whose 
existence constitutes a ground for the possibilities of all other beings. This necessary 
being, God, is a "first real ground of absolute possibility" and includes in itself 
everything thinkable. But now Kant disengages himself from his former line of 
thought; he draws a distinction which makes sense only if there exist unrealized 
possibilities. Kant must have reconsidered the problem of God's responsibility, be­
cause he nows says: 
Ich nenne diejenige Abhangigkeit eines Dinges von Gott, da er ein Grund 
desselben durch seinen Willen ist, moralisch, alle iibrige aber ist unmor­
alisch. Wenn ich demnach behaupte, Gott enthalte den letzten Grund sel­
bst der innem Moglichkeit der Dinge, so wird ein jeder leicht verstehen, 
dass diese Abhangigkeit nur unmoralisch sein kann; denn der Will macht 
nichts moglich, sondem beschliesst nur, was als moglich Schon voraus­
gesetzt ist. (Werke II, ed. by Ernst Cassirer, Berlin, 1922, p. 106,.) 
In respect to "inner" possibilities (i.e., those permanent possibilities in which we 
are here interested) Kant thus has as it were "intellectualized" them; he has now lo­
cated them in God's thought and separated them from God's will. (This is a distinc­
tion which Descartes, as we shall later see, did not make.) Possibilities now have 
their own mode of being independent of their realizations, and Kant finds no rea­
son any more to maintain their unconditional realization. 
In his demonstration of God's existence Kant makes another distinction that is 
going to remain a fixture of his thinking from then on. He separates in the concept 
of possibility logical and real "aspects". (Both of these concern inner possibilities.) 
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Ein Triangel, der einen rechten Winkel hat, ist an sich selber moglich. Der 
Triangel sowohl als der..recht Winkel sind die Data oder das Materiale in 
diesem Moglichen, die Ubereinstimmung aber des einen mit dem andern 
nach dem Satze des Widerspruchs sind das Formale der Moglichkeit. Ich 
werde dieses letztere auch das Logische in der Moglichkeit nennen, weil die 
-Vergleichung der Pradikate mit ihren Swbjekt en nach der Regel der Wahr­
heit nicpts anders als eine logische Beiziehung ist: das Etwas oder was in 
dieser Ubereinstimmung steht, wird bisweilen das Reale der Moglichkeit 
heissen. (Werke, Vol. II, ed. by E. Cassirer, p. 82.) 
Logical possibility is, according to Kant, only formal possibility, and without 
material for thinking it is bound to remain empty. Thus every possibility has to. 
ground itself in something real. If nothing were to exist, there would not be any­
thing to think about, and accordingly nothirig would be possible and everything 
impossible. 
In the year 1770, in the year of his dissertation De Mundi sensibilis atque intelli­
gibilis for ma et �rinciplis, Kant already stands on the threshold of his critical phil­
osophy. This work was intended as a propedeutic to metaphysics, and its chief aim 
was to draw a boundary between the sensible and the intellectual modes of know­
ledge. Metaphysics was to be a science that would yield the supreme principles of 
the use of pure understanding. Besides sensible knowledge (cognitio sensitiva) there 
is, Kant says, also rational or intellectual knowledge (cognitio intellectualis ration­
alis ). This intellectual knowledge refers to the intelligible world, to its objective 
principles, and to its denizens, the things in themselves. In analogy to the distinc­
tion Kant had made in his proof of God's existence, he now distinguishes in the use 
of understanding two modes. The real use (usus realis) is the one through which 
concepts of things and relations are given to us, while the logical use (usus logicus) 
means comparing these concepts with one another according to· the law of contra­
diction. The results of the real use of understanding, intellectual concepts, are pure 
ideas (id£oepura), i.e., they are given in pure reason. They are not abstracted from 
experience and hencEl owe nothing to it. Among these intellectual concepts Kant 
lists possibility, existence, necessity, substance, and cause, together with their oppo­
sites and correlates (§8). 
From this intellectual world we have no intuition, only symbolic knowledge 
(cognilio symbolica).  Pure reasoning proceeds always in terms of general concepts 
in abstracto, never in terms of singular representation in concreto. Intellectual con­
cepts as such are empty of all intuitive content, at least for us human beings. But 
this is something we do not always grasp. Our reason is seduced by illusions and 
mixes the sensible with the intellectual. Kant calls "deceitful axiom" ( axioma sup­
repticium) a statement that attaches something sensible by necessity to everything 
intellectual. To refute this illusion Kant lays down his principle of reduction: 
Wenn von einen beliebigen Verstandesbegriff etwas allgemein ausgesagt 
wird, was zu den Beziehungen von Raum und Zeit gehort: so darf es nicht 
objektiv ausgesagt werden und bezeichnet nur die Bedingung, ohne welche 
der gegebene Begriff nicht sinnlich erkennbar ist (§25). 
If the subject of a proposition is a intellectual concept and the predicate a sensible 
one the proposition cannot be taken to be objectively valid. We cannot say: "Every­
thing that exists, is somewhere ( quidquid existit, est alicubi) because we are not 
allowed to restrict existence, as such to conditions of our sensible knowledge, in the 
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example at hand, space." But conversely we can say: "Everything that is somewhere, 
exists." In other words, our intellectual concepts "cover" our sensible ones, but not 
vice versa (§24). 
One mode of this illusion through which sensible cognition can steal into an in-
tellectual concept is the following. 
Die namliche sinnliche Bedingung, unter der die Unterordnung irgend eines 
vorkommenden Genstandes unter einen ,gegebenen Verstandesbegriff allein 
moglich ist, ist auch die Bedingung der Moglichkeit des Gegenstandes 
selbst (§26). 
The sensible conditions, according to which we decide if something belongs to the 
extension of given intellectual concept, are not the conditions on which a thing in 
itself belongs to the extension of that concept. That is why it is not true to say: 
Everything contingent sometimes fails to exist (quidquid exsistit contingenter, ali­
quando non.exstitit) (§29). 
Now the rejection by Kant of this proposition means a rejection of the Principle 
of Plenitude. The proposition is implied by the Principle of Plenitude. For c:ontin­
gence means precisely that for which it is possible not to exist. Hence the proposi­
tion claims that every possib.ility of that kind is sometimes realized. Kant does not 
accept the proposition, and accordingly rejects the Principle. This kind of proposi­
tion is a product of the "poverty of reason" (penuria intellectus) (§29), he says. In 
it, a knowing subject has imposed his own limitations on the objects in themselves 
presuming that "marks of identificationn fetched from his experience are also those 
of the thing in itself. The best we can do is the following "subjective statement". 
Wovon nicht f eststeht, dass es irgend einmal nicht gewesen ist, von � 
Zufaliigkeit gibt es nach dem gemeinen Verstand keine geniigenden Merk­
maie (§29). 
From the possibility of a thing in itself (i.e., from its possibility as the intellectual 
concept that it is) we can say nothing that would limit it to the conditions of space 
and time. Our actual use of understanding (and of its products) does not reduce to 
our sensibility: What is given to us in understanding is often separated by a chasm 
from what is given to us in untuition. 
Denn dieser Widerstreit zwischen dem sinnlichen und denkenden Vermo­
gen ... zeigt nur an, dass die Seele die uon dem Verstande empfangenen ab­
strakten V orstellungen oft nicht in concreto auszufuhren und in A nschau­
ungen zu uerwandeln uermag (§1). 
Here it is seen especially clearly how Kant's attitude to the Principle of Plenitude 
depends on, and is an indication of, his assumptions concerning the range of possi­
bilities we have to keep an eye on. For his rejection of the Principle in 1770 is a 
consequence of extending the range of serious "intelligible" possibilities far beyond 
what we can hope to find in experience. 
These precritical views of Kant's are "uncritical" in that they leave open a host 
of important questions. What is the abstract symbolic knowledge like which he pos­
tulates and which is not reducible to intuition? How does Kant for instance !know, 
as he claims to know, that "'this world, even though it exists contingently, is eter­
nal" (§29)? What is the source of this knowledge and its non-intuitive criterion? 
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Attempts tp patch up these gaps led Kant gradually to his critical maturity. In doing 
so he adopts the Principle of Plenitude again, but now in a revised "critical" form. 
Neither this dlouble change of mind away from the Principle of Plenitude and back 
again to a qualified form of the Principle nor its connection with the general devel· 
opment of Kant's thought is registered neither by Schneeberger or by Pape. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant preserves his distinction between logical and 
real possibility. A concept is possible if it is not self ·contradictory. This is the logi­
cal mark of possibility (B 625). But this logical possibility makes the concept possi· 
ble only according to the analytical conditions of cognition. A logically possible 
concept can still remain "empty", i.e., uninstantiated. Kant explicitly warns us not 
to confuse such a logical possibility of a concept with the real possibility of a thing. 
For to substitute the logical possibility of the concept (namely, that the 
concept does not contradict itself) for the transcendental possibility of 
things (namely, that an object corresponds to the concept) can deceive and 
leave satisfied only the simple-minded (B 302). 
It is scarcely surprising that after Kant has equated the transcendental (real) pos· 
sibility of a thing with the fact that there really is a thing corresponding to the giv­
en object, he can indicate his regained qualified approval of the Principle of Pleni­
tute with respect to possibilities of experience. 
If, therefore, I represent to myself all existing objects of the senses im all 
time and in all places, I do not set them in space and time (as being here) 
prior to experience. This representation is nothing but the thought of a 
possible experience in its absolute completeness (B 523-524). 
All spatio-temporally existing objects of senses thus make up all the possible objects 
of experience. Likewise after having asked whether "the field of possibility is larger 
than the field which contains all actuality" (B 282), Kant declares: 
It does indeed seem as if we were justified in extending the number of pos­
sible things beyond that of the actual, on the ground that something must 
be added to the possible to constitute the actual. But this (alleged) process 
of adding to the possible I refuse to allow. For that which would have to be 
added to the possible, would be impossible (B 284). 
How is this qualified return of Kant to the camp of the supporters of the Princi­
ple of Plenitude to be understood? What caused Kant to change his views about pos­
sibilities and their realizations so radically? What is involved is a fundamental revi­
sion of Kant's ideas about the distinction between sensibility and understanding. In 
the first Critique there is no longer the unbridgeable gap between them that Kant 
postulated in De Mundi . . . .  
Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it  alone yields us intui­
tions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the under­
standing arise concepts. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by 
way of certain characters, relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, 
with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to 
us (B 33). 
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When we are discussing the transcendental, real possibilities of things (objects) we 
therefore have to stay with.in the purview of sensibility, i.e., within the sphere of 
empirical thinking. According to Kant's postulate of empirical thought 
that which agrees with the formal conditions of experience, that is, with 
the conditions of intuition and of concepts, is possible (B 265). 
In a sense the concept of possibility has thus lost its earlier status of an intellectual 
concept and a pure idea. Admittedly it is still included among concepts of pure un­
derstanding. It is still a category. However, this "purity" of the concept of possibil­
ity is only relative. At least indirectly all categories have to be related to sensibility. 
Categories are "a priori conditions upon which experience in general in its formal 
aspects rests". In this case the concept still belongs "to experience inasmuch as its 
object is to be met with only in experience" (B 267). 
In another sense these categories are of course still "pure". 'fhey are given to us 
by "pure syJlthesis" (B 104), not by the experientially grounded empirical synthe­
sis through which empirical concepts are given (B 267). Therefore, since categories, 
"yielding knowledge of things, have no kind of application, save only in regard to 
things which may be objects of possible experience" (B 14 7-148), they have to be 
tied somehow to experience .. This tie is accomplished by what Kant calls the "tran­
scendental schemata" of categories. 
Now every concept has its own schema, i.e., a i:ule that make the content of the 
concept "intuitive" through general representation. Pure concepts of understanding 
have their transcendental schemata. Since pure concepts of understanding are 
"quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions" (B 176) there is a problem of how 
categories can be applied to appearanc�s. Obviously, Kant says, there has to be 
"some third thing" which is homogeneous on the one hand wit!h categories and on 
the other hanQ with appearances, in order to make the application of the former to 
the latter possible. This "third thing" is precisely the transcendental schema of the 
given category (B 177). These transcendental schemata in tum owe their ability to 
accomplish this connection completely to the form of inner intuition, which is for 
Kant time. In fact they are "nothing but a priori determinations of time in accord­
ance with rules" (B 184). Kant likewise says that the real mediator between cate­
gories and appearances is the "transcendental determination of time" which is "so 
far homogeneous with the category .. .in that it is universal and rests upon a priori 
rule" and homogeneous with appearance "in that time is contained in every empiri­
cal representation of the manifold" (B 177-178). In each schema time is determined 
differently. The schema of possibility is 
the agreement of the synthesis of different representations with the condi­
tions of time in general. Opposites, for instance, cannot exist in the same 
thing at the same time, but only the one after the other. The schema is 
therefore the determination of the representation of a thing at some time 
or other (B 184). 
The difference between the schemata of possibility and actuality (which is: exist· 
ence at some determinate time, (B 184) does not lie in whether but in how, an ob­
ject belongs to time. Since Kant, in his doctrine of transcendental idealism, had 
stated that 
everything intuited in space or time, and therefore an objects of any exper-
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ience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representa­
tions, which, in the manner in which they are represented, as extended be­
ings., or as series of alterations, have no independent existence outside our 
thoughts (B 518-519), 
it is clear that Kant's reference to "the representation of a thing" in the schema of 
possibility does not introdqce any unintuited things in themselves. The difference 
between possibility and actuality does not lie in the objects, but merely in the char­
acter of their reiationship to the knowing subject. What has to be added, according 
to Kant, to possibility in order for it to reach actuality "is only a relation to my un­
derstanding, that ... there should be connection with some perception" (B 284). Be­
cause whatever is connected with perception is actual, the difference lies only in 
that whether this connection is acheived now or only sometimes. 
A schema is a "condition of judgement" (Bedingung der Urteilskraft) for the cat­
egories, without which we could not subsume anything under them (B 304 ). As 
such they obviously are restrictive conditions. Moreover, for Kant the "tie" that 
connects these concepts of understanding to the conditions of sensibility, i.e., their 
schematization, is indispensable for them to have any significance whatsoever. 
The schemata of the pure concepts of understanding are thus the true and 
sole conditions under which these concepts obtain relation to objects and 
so possess significance. In the end, therefore, the categories have no other 
possible employment than the empirical (B 185 ). 
On the basis of these assumptions Kant asks, as if the question were addressed to his 
earlier self, what else could be understood by contingence than the possibility of 
non-being, and how else we could know this but from representing to ourselves a 
series of appearances which involve a change from being to non-being or conversely 
(B 301). His implicit answer is of course: from nothing else. 
We can thus see how Kant's qualified re-adoption of the Principle of Plenitude 
Oows from the same. source as his introduction of the schemata. This common 
source is his restriction of the legitimate use of the concepts of understanding to 
possible experience. This is in keeping with the general outlook on Kant's critical 
philosophy mentioned above. 
This appears indirectly also from the qualifications Kant makes in connection 
with the notion of real or empirical possibility. Kant warns us that, even though our 
concept of possibility is meaningful only in its schematized form, this is merely a 
consequence of our mode of cognition. For us humans the possible comprises only 
what is in accordance with the transcendental conditions of cognition, but in a sense 
these conditions themselves are only possible. Thus 
what is possible only under conditions which themselves are merely possi­
ble is not in all respects possible. But such (absolute) possibility is in ques­
tion when it is asked whether the possibility of things extends further than 
experience can reach (B 284). 
But this concept of absolUJte possibility (possibillity in all respects) is to be firmly 
distinguished from the category of possibility. It "is no mere concept of under­
standing, and can never be employed empirically. It belongs exclusively to reason, 
which transcends all possible empirical employment of the understanding" (B 285). 
This distinction is important also the other way round. Our category of pos:sibil-
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ity cannot refer to things in themselves. This is a mistake of the "transcendental 
realism" and it is to be avoided. Hence even though sensibility has gained ground in 
Kant's thought since De Mundi ... , it has to be prevented from getting too «arrcr 
gant". This is to be done by means of the concept of understanding and by means 
of the concept of noumenon-"that is, of a thing which is not to be thought as ob­
ject of senses but as a thing in itself, solely through a pure understanding" (B 310). 
The role of the concep't of noumenon is mainly a negative one. It is a limiting 
concept, "the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility" (B 311), 
i.e., to deflect 
der Anmassungen des (schematisierten) Verstandes als ob er (indem er a 
priori die Bedingungen der Moglichkeit aller Binge, die er erkennen kann, 
abzugehen vermag) dadurch auch die Moglichkeit aller Dinge iiberhaupt in 
diesen Grenzen beschlossen habe. (Critique of Judgement, preface to the 
second edition, (additions by Pape)). 
Noumena are not a special kind of objects (intelligible objects) for our under­
standing. By their means our understanding acquires only "negative extension", 
Kant says (B 312). As such, they are indispensable to remind us that noumena are 
not accessible to our understanding, including our concepts of (empirical) possibil· 
ity. Even though thus we cannot claim any validity for our concepts of noumena, 
we still can have an unde:rstanding of noumena "problematically", Kant says (B 
310). But, positively speaking, for us humans noumena are neither possible nor im­
possible (B 343). They are simply beyond our categories. A fortiori, they cannot 
yield for us a genuine counter-example to the Principle of Plenitude. 
Prima facie, Kant's attitude to the Principle of Plenitude might seem to resemble 
rather closely that of Thomas Aquinas. This saint had also held adopting the inter­
pretation ably defined by Simo Knuuttila (see "Jumalan mahdollisuuksein lisaanty­
minen keskiajalla" Teologinen Aikakauskirja (1974), pp. 105-121) that the Princi­
ple is valid only for human possibilities but not for absolute (Divine) ones. Aquinas' 
viewpoint, ljke Kant's is basically epistemological. According to him (and here we 
follow Knuuttila rather closely), at the bottom of human epistemic possibilities 
there is always something real. Each and every universal is obtained from reality 
through sense-perception, and these abstract concepts are the elements of all our 
cognition. Knowledge consists in compositio and divisio carried out by the human 
intellect when it unites that which is united in re and separates that which is separ­
ated in re. Possibilia secundum potentiam are for Thomas natural possibilities, and 
with respect to them the Principle of Plenitude holds good, for we can obtain the 
concept (form) of such a possibility only in virtue of its having been realized in the 
world. These possibilities are the only possibilities we know. 
But there is also another kind of possibility, absolute possibility, possible abso­
lutum, which is defined as freedom from contradiction. In the sphere of these abso­
lute possibilities the Principle is no longer tenable according to Thomas. 
In our human situation we can only form such compositions as are always (by 
necessity) or sometimes (possibly) actualized in re. The reason for this is of course 
the way in which our ideas of possibility are according to Aquinas derived from the 
actual res and which was just mentioned. For the same reason, our epistemic possi­
bilities are inseparable from physical possibilities. Hence all examples Thomas can 
give us of epistemic possibilities should also be ontologically real possibilities. But 
absolute possibilities are also in another sense epistemic ones. They are in effect 
God's epistemic possibilities. (Hence the denial of the validity of the Principle of 
Plenitude by Aquinas with respect to absolute possibilities is probably calculated to 
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uphold God's freedom from all necessity to actualize all his possibilities.) Although 
all the possibilities of nature are absolute possibilities, the converse does not hold. 
However, we cannot know any of those supernatural absolute possibilities. These 
are only known by God, and they relate to orders of being quite different from 
those of which a human mind can have any idea. 
But although human beings cannot be acquainted by means of their natural epis­
temic capacities with these absolute possibilities which are known only by God, 
they can know that the range of absolute possibilities exceeds the created reality. It 
is possible to deduce from this real universe the existence of God and the indepen­
dence of His possibilities from the possibilities of nature (and thus from the possi­
bilities accessible to human cognition). 
Thus there is a certain similarity between absolute possibilities according to 
Aquinas and according to Kant. Neither can be reached by the normal operations of 
the human understanding, and yet the idea of such possjhiJitiP� is indispensable. 
This similarity between Kant and Aquinas is in keeping with the fact that 
for Kant as for Aquinas absolute possibilities are in a certain sense humanly incom­
prehensible. This is vividly shown, in the case of Aquinas, by a quotation given by 
Knuuttila (p. 117) where St. Thomas speaks of the union of Christ's human and 
divine natures: 
sed haec est quaedam unio singularis supra omnes modos unionis nobis 
notos .... Et ideo, sicut virtus eius non est limitata ad istos mo dos bonitatis 
et esse qui sunt in creaturis, sed po test f acere novos mod is bonitatis et esse 
nobis incognitos; ... (De Unione Verbilncarnati q. un., a. le.). 
Kant, on his part, likewise affirms that we cannot make to ourselves slightest repre­
sentations of the possible objects of. intellectual intuition. We are bound to our 
forms of intuition and understanding (B 311-312). 
Other forms of intuition than space and time, other forms of understand­
ing than the discursive forms of thought, or of knowledge through con­
cepts, even if they should be possible, we cannot render in any way con­
ceivable and comprehensible to ourselves; and even assuming that we could 
do so, they still would not belong to experience-the only kind of know­
ledge in which objects are given to us (� 283). 
This similarity of Aquinas' view with Kant's can also be looked upon from the 
opposite direction. Kant based his belief in the Principle of Plenitude on the way in 
which time is schematized. Now Kant held that there could be rational beings other 
than us finite humans who unlike us could have intuitions not connected with sense­
perception. Here Kant clearly has in mind the relation of the infinite being, i.e., 
God, to particulars. The direct relation to particulars which in His case corresponds 
to sense-perception is creativity or, as Kant calls it, spontaneity. God beholds in­
dividuals by creating them, while our perception can never create its objects, at best 
the framework {i.e., space and time) into which they are structured. But if so, God 
would not need any schematization, and Kant's r,eason for adopting the Principle of 
Plenitude for human thinking would fail to apply to God's possibilities. This indeed 
seems to be at least compatible with what he says. 
But the opposite conclusion seems to be equally compatible with what Kant says one 
can make a are for an application of the Principle t.o God, although not for the same rea­
sons as to us finite beings. If God really exhibits that complete spontaneity which 
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characterizes intellectual intuition, everything that exists would be given to him by 
His own activity (B 68). Man, finite and sensible being is on his part dependent on 
his capacity for receiving representations (on his receptivity, see B 33). We shall re­
turn to this point below in discussing Decartes. 
Man, with his spontaneity of understanding, can only think "creatively". For in­
tuitions he must resort to the senses (B 135). In cont�ast, divine understanding 
would by its creativity Jn representing something by the same time make this "some­
thing" become existing (cf. B 139). God wouldn't have any need to remember, or 
to anticipate, what happens, for He lives in an eternal present. He would not have 
any relation to time, and thus to our schematized categories. 
For were I to think an understanding which is itself intuitive (as, for example, 
a divine understanding which should not represent to itself given olbjects, 
but through whose representation the objects should themselves be given 
or produced), the categories would have no meaning whatsoever in respect 
of such a mode of knowledge (B 145 ). 
Thus it seems to be a matter of opinion if we say either that in respect to God's 
possibilities the Principle o:f Plenitude holds good (everything in Him is "actual") or 
that it does not hold good (our categories of actuality and possibility do not reach 
him). Perhaps we shpuld rather ask to what extent the niche Kant left in his philos­
ophy to the concept of God in the first place is to be taken very seriously. In the 
best case, God will be for Kant an idea which cannot be fully realized even in think­
ing, 
Many similarities with Kant are thus in evidence in Aquinas. Among them there 
are the following. 
(i) Contrast between absolute and real possibilities. 
(ii) The unknowability of absolute possibilities. 
(iii) The need of nevertheless postulating these absolute possibilities. 
(iv) The equation of epistemic and natural possibilities. 
(v) Principle of Plenitude holds for real possibilities. 
(vi) The motivation of the Principle is in both cases epistemological rath­
er than (say) o.ntological. 
However, in spite of such similarities there obtains an important difference be­
tween Kant's views and the teachings of St. Thomas. The difference is in fact a neat 
corollary to Kant's often misunderstood "Copernican Revolution". Aquinas bases 
his belief in the applicability of the Principle to all humanly conceivable possibili­
ties on the way we obtain our conceptions of all these sundry possibilities: we re­
ceive them for actualizations of the very corresponding possibilities. Small wonder, 
then, that theY. are all actually realized. 
In contrast, Kant bases his qualified belief in the realization of all experiential 
possibilities on the way we humans actively represent a certain concept (that of 
time) in our experience. The principle does not apply by courtesy of the mind-inde­
dendent sources of our conceptions, but in virtue of what we ourselves do to give 
them an experiential manifestation. And the gist of Kant's self-conscious "Coperni­
can Revolution" was just to emphasize the role of our own "movements", that is, 
activities in all human knowledge. 
Thus both Aquinas and Kant are basing their appraisal of tlhe Principle of Pleni­
tude on epistemological considerations. However, Aquinas' epistemology is iin this 
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respect an empiricist one. We receive our concepts from their actual instantiations 
in the world. In contrast, Kant's epistemology is transcendental in his own sense of 
the word. It focuses on what we ourselves do to represent our concepts in exper­
ience, and sees in them the starting-point of "critical'; philosophy. In his preface to 
the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant, "proceeding precisely on 
the lines of Copernicus'', rejects the view that knowledge must conform to objects. 
Rather, he says, objects or experience must conform to concepts. As Copernicus 
had made the spectators move, Kant transformed the knowing subject from a still­
standing and passive receiver to a "moving" or active constructor (B xvi-xvii). We 
shall return to the further r,epercussions of this difference. 
On the basis of what has been said, it is clear that categories, as concepts or pure 
understanding, and their schemata are completely a priori. They are concepts to 
which all objects of experience must adjust themselves and with which they there­
fore must agree. And all objects of experience must do this because we make them 
to do so, because this is how our understanding operates. It is for this reason that 
we can be sure that all experience conforms to our categories. However, Kant's 
Copernican Revolution cuts even deeper than this. Even what he calls "empirical 
concepts'', although they are "derived from experience" (B 267), are in a sense 
products of our own mind. They are also created by an act of synthesis, if now by 
an empirical one. Admittedlly we receive representations, i.e., our mind must be 
affected in a certain way in order to prompt our creative apparatus into activity. 
We derive our empirical concepts from the representations of apprehension, but in 
fact we can so to speak decide what manifold of representations is united to an ob­
ject. We have to lay down a rule-partly a priori in that we do not find this rule in 
representations, partly a posteriori in that it must be based on the received repre­
sentations-which sucessions of representations make up an object . 
. 
. . . appearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, 
can be represented as an object distinct from them only if it stands under 
a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessi­
tates some one particular mode of connection of the manifold. The object 
is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary 
rule of apprehension (B 236). 
Concepts can thus be divided into three groups. First, there are tlhe concepts of pure 
understanding, categories, secondly, there are concepts created by the "objective 
reality of synthesis" (B 624), i.e., by synthesis contained in experience. Thirdly, 
there are empty concepts to which we also have given rise by our ability to think 
creatively but which do not find their counterpart in experience. These are accord· 
ingly not concepts of possible objects. 
In short, according to Kant we combine successive representations of apprehen­
sion into a single object and thus derive the concept of this object. Then we state 
that objects that conform to such concepts are possible objects. To be able to de· 
cide whether a concept is an empty one or a concept of a possible object, it has to 
be shown that it really has been created by an objectively real synthesis, This Kant 
must have meant when he wrote: 
But it (i.e., a concept) may none-the-less be an empty concept, unless the 
objective reality of the synthesis through which the concept is generated 
has been specifically proved; and such proof, as we have shown above, 
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rests on principles of possible experience, and not on the principles of an­
alysis (the law of contradiction). This is a warning against arguing directly 
from the logical possibility of concepts to the real possibility of things. 
(B 624, footnote.) 
Thus wlhat has happened is that Kant, in becoming "critical,, and in adopting 
again that once so sternly rejected Principle of Plenitude, ha.s not so much widened 
the sphere of realizations to match the range of possibilities: as reduced the field of 
possibilities and made them adjust themselves to actualities. What is especially note­
worthy here, Kant's re-adopting of the Principle is a consequence of his "Coperni­
can" emphasis on the role of human activity (constructivity) in bringing about this 
adjustment of possibilities to actualities. 
It is of course virtually impossible that the views of Aquinas on modality should 
have exerted any influence on Kant, by agreement or by disagreement. However, 
another thinker whose speculative ideas are in certain relevant respects not so far 
from Aquinas clearly did influence Kant. This philosopher is Descartes. He presents 
in fact interesting similarities and dissimilarities both with Kant and with Aquinas. 
If we look at the thinking of Descartes from the epistemic point of view, we find as 
his primary datum the famous "clear and distinct ideas". Descartes takes it to be a 
"first principle" that there is "nothing in the effect that has not existed in a similar 
or in some higher form in the cause" (The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. 
II, tr. by Haldane & Ross, p. 34.) For this reason he can also say that "every perfec­
tion existing objectively in an idea must exist actually in something that causes that 
idea" (ibid., p. 35 ). After demonstrating the existence of God, "who is all perf ec­
tion and truth", Descartes see that "our ideas or notions, which to the extent of 
their being clear or distinct are ideas of real things issuing from God, cannot but to 
that extent be true" (Vol. I, p. 105). 
In view of our theme it is interesting to see that these clear and distinct ideas can 
also be understood as permanent possibilities. For in a sense we can apprehend as 
possible only that which we have a clear and distinct idea about. If so, we see that 
according to Descartes we can apprehend as possible only what is actual. 
But we possess the idea of a power so great that by Him and Him alone, in 
whom this power is found, must heaven and earth be created, and a power 
SU!ch that likewise whatever else is apprehended by me as possible must be 
created by Him too (Vol. II, p. 59). 
This "must" which seems to be decreed by Descartes on God greatly offended 
Leibniz, who called Descartes' assumption "the first falsehood and the basis of athe· 
istic philosophy". In reality, this assumption is but the good old Principle of Pleni· 
tude. (See Hintikka, "Leibniz on Plenitude, Relations, and 'the Reign of Law"'.) 
Like Aquinas (and later Kant) Descartes also saw that these possibilities available 
to human understanding by no means could be taken as exhausting the sphere of 
absolutely all possibilities. We must remember, he states as his principle xxiv of the 
Principles of Philosophy. that "our understanding is finite, .and the power of God 
infinite.,, As a hint of those possibilities that we don't understand clearly God has 
revealed mysteries of incarnation and the Trinity, among others. We have to believe 
in them, although they surpass the range of our natural power of intelligence. "For 
we should not think it strange that in the immensity of His nature, as also in the ob­
jects of His creation, there are many things beyond the range of our comprehen· 
sion" (Vol. I, p. 229). 
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Descartes' God is thus rather like the creatively and intellectually intuiting God 
of Kant's philosophy. For Him there is no distinction between possibility and actu­
ality. In a letter to Mersenne (May 6, 1630) where Descartes speaks about God's re­
lationship to truth, he uses the terms "possible" and "true" alternatively. 
As for the eternal truths, I say once more that they are true or possible on­
ly bec·ause God knows them as true or possible. They are not known as true 
by God in any way which would imply that they are not true independent­
ly of Him (Philosophical Letters, tr. and ed. by Anthony Kenny, Claren­
don Press, Oxford, 1970, p. 13.) 
This is because God's will is in a position fundamentally different from ours. He 
does not have any pre-existing options to choose from. Nothing exists before God's 
act of will. 
As to the freedom of will, a very different account must be given of it as it 
exists in God and as it exists in us. For it is self-contradictory that the will 
of God should not have been from eternity indifferent to all that has come 
to pass or that ever will occur, because we can form no conception of any­
thing good or true, of anything to be believed or to be performed or to be 
omitted, the idea of which in the devine understanding before God's will 
determined Him so to act as to bring it to pass. (Philosophical Works of 
Descartes, Vol. II, p. 248.) 
Descartes' God thinks "creatively", i.e., thought cannot be separated from wiill in a 
case of God. We cannot speak of any universe of ideas of existing before the act of 
creation or "of ideally pre-existing 'possible worlds'", as Ingetrud Pape aptly puts it 
in her Tradition und Transformation der Modalitat, p. 75. God's cognition and His 
will are one and the same. 
If men really un9erstood the sense of their words they could never say 
without blasphemy that the truth of anything is prior to the knowledge 
which God has of it. In God willing and knowing are a single thing in such 
a way that by the uery fact of willing something he knows it and it is only 
for this reason that such a thing is true. (Philosophical Letters, pp. 1 3-14.) 
Not even the law of contradiction can bind this creatively thinking God. He would 
have done possible things he actually made to be impossible. He has decided what 
things stand in contradiction to each other; and even those contradicting relation­
ships are necessary (to us) it must not be necessary for God to make it so. 
I tum to the difficulty of conceiving how it was free and indifferent for 
God to make it not true that the three angles of a triangle wer� equal to 
two right angles, or in general that contradictories could not be true toget­
her. It is easy to dispel this difficulty by considering that the power of God 
cannot have any limits, and that our mind is finite and so created as to be 
able to conceive as possible things which God has wished to be in fact pos­
sible, but not to be able to conceive as possible things which God could 
have made possible, but which he has in. fact wished to make impossible ... 
But if we would know the immensity of his power we should not put these 
thoughts before our minds, nor should we conceive any precedence or pri-
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ority between his understanding and his will; for the idea which we have of 
God teaches us that there is in Him only a single activity, entirely simple 
and entirely pure. This is well expressed by the words of St. Augustine: 
They are so because you see them to be so; because in God seeing and will­
ing are one and the same thing. (Philosophical Letter:s, p. 150-151.) 
Now the law of contradiction presumably will never be actually violated. For it 
surely is based on most "clear and distinct" ideas. Hence the realization of all possi­
bilities cannot in some sense apply to God. The range of possibilities we saw Him 
realizing according to Descartes can only be the range of natural possibilities, which 
presumably is what our "clear and distinct" ideas are all about anyway. As in Aqui­
nas, so in Descartes the Principle of Plenitude apparently does not apply in any ob­
vious sense to the characteristically divine possibilities. 
However, here the problem mentioned earlier hits us (and Descartes) with ven­
geance. The Cartesian God is  an actus purus in a peculiarly strong sense. He creates 
all possibilities, too, and not only their actualizations. Hence it sounds perfectly ab­
surd for Descartes to speak of God's possibilities He has not realized. Yet we must 
at the same time say that He does this freely, which implies that there are "things 
which God could have made possible" but which He in fact has made impossible. 
These are of course humanly incomprehensible, but they come dangerously close to 
being nonsensical, too. This is an instance of the problems that come about in ap­
plying the Principle of Plenitude as soon as we cannot assume a neat pre-existing 
range of possibilities. Indeed, the collapse of possiblity and actuality as well as of 
the notion of possibility to God, except·in the qualified sense of natural possibili­
ties. This is clearly reminiscent of Kant. 
The most interesting partial analogy may nevertheless obtain, not between Des­
cartes' and Kant's theological ideas, but between the Cartesian God and a Kantian 
man. In so far as the Principle of Plenitude applied to the Cartesian God, it is be­
cause He has through His own creative activity defined what counts as possible and 
impossible. Likewise, the reason why the Principle holds for a Kantian man was 
found to be that we ourselves as it were define what is and what isn't possible ex­
perience by imposing our own terms on all such experience. On different levels, 
these terms are embodied in the forms of sensibility, in the categories, and in their 
role in empirical synthesis, as well as in the schemata. Quite apart from the details 
of Kant's account, it thus looks as if Kant has stolen some of the creative liberty of 
the Cartesian God and awarded it to Man. 
From the vantage point of this partial analogy we can at least understand what 
the main problem with Kant's theory of possibility was bound to be, andl why. 
Ingetrud Pape has written: 
84 
Aus dieser Frage ergibt sich fiir Kant jene kuhne 'Idee', die vielleicht das 
neuartigste Moment seiner gesemten Modaltheorie ausmacht. Am revolu­
tionierendsten namlich ist der Gedanke, dass die Modalitaten iiberhaupt 
nur Aspekte unseres Verstandes darsteUen, d.h. dass sie weder der Sache 
an sich, noch einem anders strukturierten Verstande zukommen mussen. 
Sieht man das in dem ganzen Horisont seiner Folgen, so zeight sich zuletzt 
das verbluff ende Faktum, dass die Einsetzung der Modalitat zum system­
atischen Thema, wie sie erstmalig in der Problemgeschichte bei Kant sich 
vollzog, zugleich und in selben Akt ihre Aufhebung als metaphysischer 
Thema bedeutet.... (Pape, p. 234.) 
17
Hintikka: Kant on "The Great Chain of Being"
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1976
JAAKKO HINTIKKA 
However, this "Aufhebung" of the traditional conception of modality is but a cor­
ollary to the problem we discussed in connection with Descartes concerning God's 
primacy vis-a-vis the range of possibilities. When Kant puts man in the role of God 
in establishing himself what counts as possible, the same puzzles are bound to arise. 
Such a role assigned to human thinking is bound to eliminate to some extent the 
boundary of possibility and actuality, which is reflected by Kant's precarious re­
adoption of the Principle of Plenitude. Perhaps even more importantly, it is also 
bound to make the very concept of possibility problematic, for we cannot in one 
and the same logical breath say that we humans have established what counts as pos­
sible, and that this could in principle be done differently, i.e., that it is possible 
that this decision should have been made otherwise. But this is precisely Descartes' 
predicament in speaking of his conceptually creative God. 
This predicament is also reflected by such Kantian pronouncements as bear on 
the Principle of Plenitude. The reader has probably shared some of our frustration 
at not being able to produce a completely unequivocal avowal of the Principle from 
Kant's mature philosophy. What we have seen about the ambiguities of the v e ry 
concept of possibility in Kant amply explains his hesitation, however. Once again, 
the Principle of Plenitude performs well its methodological function as a sensitive 
intellectual barometer. 
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